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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis demonstrates an application of machine learning for enabling 
automated decision support to warfighters operating laser weapon systems in complex 
tactical situations. The thesis used the NPS Modeling Virtual Environments and 
Simulation (MOVES) Institute’s Swarm Commander modeling and simulation software 
environment to develop simulated datasets of wargaming scenarios involving a shipboard 
laser weapon system defending against drone swarm threats. The simulated datasets were 
used to train a machine learning algorithm to predict the optimum engagement strategy in 
a complex battlespace with heterogeneous drone swarms. Multiple machine learning 
techniques were evaluated, and the classification tree technique was selected as the 
preferred approach. The final algorithm had an overall accuracy of 96% in correctly 
predicting engagement outcomes based on drone threat types, quantities, and the laser 
weapon system attack strategy. The research results demonstrate (1) the utility of 
modeling and simulation for supporting the development of tactical machine learning 
applications, (2) the potential for machine learning to support future tactical operations, 
and (3) the potential for machine learning and automation, in general, to reduce the 
cognitive load on future warfighters faced with making critical decisions in complex 
threat environments. 
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Modern tactical warfare is increasingly complex and requires faster and more 
effective decisions. To support these rapid decisions, the use of automated decision aids to 
has been proposed as a solution (Johnson 2019, 63). Decision aids require large amounts 
of data given the complex nature of modern battlefields. To support development of 
decision aids machine learning represents a potential method to support an effective 
decision aid. The goal of this research was to conduct experimentation in exploring the 
application of machine learning to help warfighters in complex laser weapon system versus 
drone swarm engagement decisions. To accomplish this goal, laser weapons systems and 
drone threats were studied, and a simulation program was selected to generate engagement 
data that could be used to train a machine learning algorithm.  
This thesis studied the threat engagement methodologies and identified decision 
factors that must be considered to effectively operate a laser weapon system as well as the 
applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning in supporting decision making. 
Base research was conducted into unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, threats to identify 
risks and support the development of engagement methodologies. The base research 
supported the selection and programming of scenarios into wargaming and simulation 
software, Swarm Commander Tactics, which was used to simulate battles. This study 
conducted an experiment to develop a machine learning algorithm proof-of-concept by 
modeling and simulating engagement scenarios to collect training data and use that data to 
train a machine learning algorithm. The intent of training the algorithm was to identify 
survivability and successful engagement methodologies when using the simulated 
shipboard laser weapon. Upon generation of simulated engagement data, multiple machine 
learning techniques were tested using the simulated engagements to determine if machine 
learning prediction could support automated decision aids based on simulated data. This  
research studied machine learning algorithmic methods and the process of developing and 
training machine learning systems.  
Overall, multiple machine learning techniques were evaluated to support prediction 
of successful drone engagement methodology within the simulated engagements, and the 
xvi 
most suitable was found to be the tree classification technique. The experimentation 
demonstrated the application of machine learning to this problem domain, through 
modeling and simulation, and machine learning algorithm training was successful. Results 
from the final machine learning algorithm predictions had an overall accuracy of 96% in 
predicting engagement outcomes based on enemy types, quantities, and laser weapon 
system attack methodology; with a false positive prediction, that is, the algorithm predicted 
win that was a loss, of 2.1%. These results show that a complex battle space simulation 
software can be used to accurately train a predictive machine learning algorithm.  
This research demonstrated that combining wargaming simulations with machine 
learning algorithms provides a mechanism for supporting complex decisions and 
engagements, by laser weapon system, against enemy drone swarms. By implementing a 
trained machine learning algorithm, it is possible to analyze a complex battlespace with a 
heterogenous drone swarm so the appropriate engagement technique can be selected 
thereby optimizing the survivability and effectiveness of target engagement. The thesis 
addressed the primary research objective of exploring the efficacy of machine learning 
methods for identifying and supporting effective target selection and engagement methods 
for a simulated shipboard laser weapon system. This research represents a building block 
for the generation of decision aids to support drone swarm engagement with a laser weapon 
system. The complex nature of the modern battlespace requires decision aids  to reduce the 
cognitive loading on the warfighter. 
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A. OVERVIEW  
Modern tactical warfare is increasingly complex and requires faster and more 
effective decisions (Johnson 2019, 63). The development of transformative and disruptive 
weapon systems is reshaping the traditional battle space. One example is the Navy’s 
development of high energy laser weapon systems (LWS). The Navy is beginning to install 
LWS on ships for test and evaluation. While these weapons offer potential improvements 
to ship and battle group defense, their performance and behavior differ significantly from 
existing traditional ordinance. Contemporary LWS are based on novel and highly advanced 
technologies. The complexity of LWS and their departure from traditional ordinance 
principles and behaviors requires a new methodology to support warfighters in the 
selection of targets for engagement. The operation of LWS requires the consideration of a 
complex set of decision factors including how much power will be used (and whether it is 
available), what the atmospheric conditions are (and how they will affect the laser beam), 
and what is known about the threat (range, kinematics, characteristics, location of 
components, material composition and thickness). These factors must be considered to 
determine at what target range to fire the weapon, to select the target aimpoint, and to 
predict what the required dwell time needs to be to burn through the target. These factors 
also inform successful engagement methodologies, for example, whether to prioritize and 
target specific enemies or engage all targets to achieve the most effective outcome.  
Advances in threat technology also contribute to the complexity of the tactical 
decision space. One type of disruptive weapon that is evolving rapidly is unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) (Dunn 2013, 1245). Modern UAVs (or drones) are particularly complex, 
as they can be deployed as swarms. See Figure 1 which depicts a UAV swarm engagement. 
The growing threat and prevalence of easy-to-field drone swarms require a change in both 
conceptual and operational changes (Guitton 2021). Drone swarms introduce a heightened 
speed of warfare that may exceed the cognitive abilities of human warfighters to make 
effective decisions in such short timeframes (Galdorisi 2019).  
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Figure 1. Using Shipboard LWS to Defend Against a UAV Swarm Threat. 
Adapted from Lockheed Martin (2020).  
The use of automated decision aids to support human warfighters has been 
proposed as a solution to address highly complex tactical decision spaces (Johnson 2019, 
17). Extensive research exists concerning algorithms, data fusion, artificial intelligence 
(AI), machine learning (ML) and automation taxonomies (Save 2013). However, the use 
of automated methods brings its own challenges. It has been demonstrated that when 
decision aids have failed to adequately apply cognitive engineering and incorporate the 
human into the system, operator and system trust issues have arisen (Paradis 1999). Should 
the aiming system not adequately incorporate the user’s skills into account, users may lose 
trust in the instrumentation system (Mann et al. 2006).  
The goal of this research is to conduct experimentation in exploring the application 
of ML to help warfighters in complex LWS versus drone swarm engagement decisions. To 
accomplish this goal, multiple ML techniques were tested using simulated LWS 
engagements to determine if ML could support automated decision aids based on simulated 
data. The overall intent was to implement ML algorithms to support human warfighters in 
their use of LWS to defend against drone swarms. This research focused on the use of ML 
to support effective human-machine teaming in making shipboard LWS engagement 
decisions to defend against complex UAV swarm threats effectively. This thesis studied 
the LWS threat engagement methodologies and identified decision factors that must be 
considered to effectively operate the system. This thesis studied ML algorithmic methods 
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and the process of developing and training ML systems as well as methods for simulating 
LWS operational scenarios to obtain datasets to train ML algorithms. Finally, this study 
conducted an ML proof-of-concept by modeling and simulating LWS scenarios to collect 
training data and using the data to train a ML algorithm for the purpose of identifying 
survivability and successful engagement methodologies using the simulated shipboard 
LWS.  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research was to determine if AI and ML methods can 
support more effective rapid target selection and engagement for a simulated shipboard 
LWS. Additional research goals were: 
• To study AI and ML methods to identify and evaluate methods suitable for 
improving LWS target selection and engagement methodology. 
• To study how ML can support a human-machine teaming approach to making 
complex LWS decisions. 
• To study the use of shipboard LWS to defend against complex UAV swarm 
threats. 
• To demonstrate the application of ML to this problem domain through 
modeling and simulation and ML algorithm training. 
• Exploiting the use of a wargaming modeling and simulation environment for 
use in gathering data sets training to train a ML algorithm. 
C. APPROACH 
This thesis addressed the research objectives through literature review, development of 
LWS modeling wargame scenarios, and experimentation using modeling and simulation 
and the development and evaluation of ML algorithms. The research approach began with 
a literature review to gather information on laser weapons, automated decision aids 
(including human-machine teaming, AI methods, and ML), and UAV swarm threats. This 
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information was used as a foundation and basis for developing and modeling LWS 
operational scenarios and identifying a ML approach. Figure 2 illustrates the process for 
developing ML algorithms; the process involves gathering data sets that are representative 
of the operational domain and using the data to train the algorithm. 
 
Figure 2. Methodology for Developing ML Systems. Adapted from Kopace 
(2021).  
This study used the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Modeling Virtual 
Environments and Simulation (MOVES) Swarm Commander Tactics (SCT) wargaming 
software to generate simulated LWS engagement datasets. The SCT software modeled a 
shipboard LWS system defending against UAV swarm threats. The simulated datasets 
were used to train an ML algorithm to perform target selection and identify effective ideal 
engagement methodologies. The ML training process was conducted generally following 
five phases gathering, preparing, training, deploying, and improving. 
This research approach provided limited experimentation into a basic ML algorithm 
approach to serve as a proof-of-concept and feasibility analysis of the future more full-
scale use of AI and ML systems to support and enhance complex LWS engagement 
decisions.  
The research approach followed six primary steps: 
1. Identify preferred ML methodology and ML techniques. 
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2. Develop and run initial LWS engagement simulation test scenarios in 
SCT. 
3. Train ML algorithm based on initial SCT modeling data. 
4. Evaluate ML techniques, compare quantitatively, and identify optimal 
technique for engagement outcome prediction. 
5. Use trained ML algorithm to generate scenario predictions and 
engagement outcome based on enemy or “Red Force” UAV threats and 
force strength as well as ally or “Blue Force” engagement tactics.  
6. Run scenarios with optimized behavior rules to evaluate accuracy of 
predictions.  
D. EXPERIMENT INTRODUCTION  
The experimentation for this thesis followed three major phases based on the ML 
methodology shown in Figure 2. 
• Phase 1 (Gathering and Preparing Phase): Developed initial simulations of 
homogenous and heterogenous threats and collected data on ship survivability 
and engagement methodology. Subsequently identified priority threats, threats 
that pose the greatest kill probability to the ship, and engagement methodology 
most likely to lead to ship survival. 
• Phase 2 (Training Phase): Utilized initial data from Phase 1 and trained a ML 
algorithm to identify Blue Force survivability and engagement strategy based 
on threat type and significance. 
• Phase 3 (Deploying and Improving Phase):  Implemented the ML algorithm to 
predict the outcome of heterogenous attack simulations, compared to actual 
simulations in SCT and quantified results to demonstrate ML performance.  
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E. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 
This research focused on the use of shipboard LWS to defend against UAV threat 
swarms as a complex tactical operation that could benefit from a human-machine teaming 
approach. The narrow scope of this thesis was intended to support the investigation of how 
AI and ML approaches can be applied to complex tactical decisions. The LWS engagement 
of UAV swarms provides a challenging threat scenario that requires target engagement 
prioritization. The NPS MOVES SCT system was an appropriate modeling and simulation 
environment to support this research’s ML proof-of-concept demonstration. The scope of 
this research covered a narrow engagement methodology specifically for engagements 
within SCT Software version 6.1. Simulations were conducted with one Blue Force Ship 
and no additional Blue Force assets, at engagement distances of under five kilometers 
within the simulated ship’s radar detection range. Red Force assets consisted of two 
primary UAV types of fighters and bombers, which are discussed in detail in Chapter III.  
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I provided the thesis overview, 
research objectives, and general approach. Chapter II highlights the background and 
literature review for the required relevant elements of this research. Chapter III describes 
the modeling and ML software used for this experiment and the methodology that was 
conducted to generate simulated data to train the ML algorithm. Chapter IV discusses the 
research results as well as the optimization and improvement of the ML process. Chapter 
V contains the research conclusion and summary and discusses potential future work.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides background information for the underlying elements 
required for the implementation of this thesis research. There are three main topics that are 
relevant to the foundation of this study: (1) an overview of laser weapons and their 
characteristics; (2) an overview of automated decisions, including AI, ML, and human 
machine teaming (HMT); and (3) an overview of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats 
and target engagement strategies.  
A. LASER WEAPON SYSTEMS  
1. Historical Background on Lasers 
The term laser is an acronym for light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation (Gould 1959). The first demonstrated laser was produced in 1960 by Ted H. 
Maiman and was constructed using a ruby rod and flash lamp (Perram et al. 2010, 5). The 
basic principle of how a laser operates is effectively and simply defined by Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory:  
A laser is created when the electrons in atoms in special glasses, crystals, or 
gases absorb energy from an electrical current or another laser and become 
“excited.” The excited electrons move from a lower-energy orbit to a 
higher-energy orbit around the atom’s nucleus. When they return to their 
normal or “ground” state, the electrons emit photons (particles of light). 
(Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [LLNL] 2021) 
Since the development of that first laser, there have been many other types invented 
for industrial purposes, consumer electronics, and non-military applications. One of the 
first research and invention investments into military applications of lasers was a DOD 
sponsored conference in 1963 to identify potential applications (Perram et al. 2010, 7). An 
early military application of the laser was its use as a range finder using a ruby and 
flashlamp laser to irradiate a target and receive the returning signals (Titterton 2016, 8). 
Additional laser demonstrations were conducted including the destruction of a visible-band 
camera which led to directed energy studies using newer gas laser to defeat heat seeking 
missiles in the 1970s (Titterton 2016, 8). Contemporary lasers in use today as full-fledged 
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LWS are commonly referred to as high energy lasers (HELs) which emit a small spot of 
light on a target to damage or destroy it (Perram et al. 2010, 10). Advanced laser systems, 
HELs, are being evaluated, demonstrated, and used by the United States Navy for multiple 
missions. There are two primary engagement approaches when utilizing a LWS for target 
neutralization: a soft-kill or a hard-kill. Soft-kills are the disruption of an enemy weapon 
system by nondestructive means, examples include blinding the sensors or optics on a 
weapon system rendering the target ineffective. Hard kills from a LWS ablate target 
components or materials causing the neutralization and physical destruction and of the 
target. The application of a hard or soft kill may be restricted based on the laser system and 
target characteristics; if the laser lacks sufficient power to destroy a target a soft kill may 
still be possible.  
2. LWS Characteristics 
Power is a primary characteristic which provides a destructive or disruptive 
capability for an LWS. Laser systems designed for hard kills typically range in power from 
50-kilowatt (kW) to one Megawatt (MW) (Perram et al. 2010, 10). A laser’s specified 
power refers to its power at the output of the laser. The power level quickly attenuates as 
the laser beam travels through the air or atmosphere. Thus, a 100 kW laser does not transmit 
100 kW directly to the target being irradiated. The actual damaging power of a LWS is 
referred to as the power in the bucket (PIB) which is the fraction of total power that can be 
delivered measured in angular units of  λ/D  where λ is the laser wavelength and D is the 
beam size (Slater 2016). Wavelengths for LWS vary depending on their design, 
construction, and materials, for example a carbon dioxide laser can emit a beam over a 
wide range of wavelengths and as a result may need to be tuned to facilitate the optimum 
wavelength for laser efficacy (Titterton 2016, 55). The beam size and quality of the beam 
are also key characteristics of the LWS. Beam edges are not clearly defined so to effectively 
quantify beam size one can use the physical space and angular space of the beam to 
generate a size value (Slater et al. 2010). The beam quality is defined as a measure of 
excellence of the beam based on the ratio of the actual spot size to the diffraction-limited 
spot size (Perram et al. 2010, 402). 
9 
 Additional key system properties for an effective LWS must also consider the 
operating ranges, target types and atmospheric conditions all of which can greatly reduce 
system capability if not factored into design and mission profiles. The amount of time that 
a laser must continuously lase a target is referred to as dwell time, this is a key aspect of 
system performance as a longer dwell time increases the time to score a target kill. 
Atmospheric conditions also play a key role in system function due to interference from 
atmospheric absorption, Rayleigh scattering, and Mie scattering (Titterton 2016, 166–167). 
Turbulence, the atmospheric motions from planetary waves can also cause system function 
degradation (Perram et al. 2010, 413). In addition to atmospheric attenuation, target 
material properties can affect the LWS system performance. To effect total heating of a 
target the target material there are up to seven material response states: expansion, material 
property change, melting, vaporization, ablation, spalling, and plasma (Perram et al. 2010, 
326). Target hard kill may occur as early as the melt stage; however, this would depend on 
the aimpoint and the component melting on the target. Target material type, configuration, 
and properties will dictate the failure modes and the probability of weapon effectiveness 
(Perram et al. 2010, 326–337).  
 Overall LWS and target characteristics represent a complex multivariable system 
interaction. The design of the LWS, atmospheric conditions, and target characteristic can 
all play a part in the probability of a hard-kill. Further data analysis on atmospheric 
conditions or intelligence on target types and construction can support a more effective 
engagement; however, these can be difficult variables to quantify in all scenarios leading 
to complex challenges that in the event of a real-time threat require fast acting responses 
from LWS operators. The United States (U.S.) Navy has begun implementation of LWS as 
part of fleet modernization and advanced ship capabilities, requiring further analysis and 
effective understanding of the key LWS characteristics. 
3. LWS Complex Decision Space 
The modern battle space is increasingly complex as new threats continue to develop 
and advance. The complexity of LWS and their characteristics and their performance 
indicators can be difficult to quantify, and factors like turbulence effects can impact 
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effective LWS range (Chen et. al. 2018). System and target characteristics greatly influence 
LWS performance and effectiveness. Tactical decision making must be performed quickly, 
effectively, and accurately in dynamic high stress environments which sets up the potential 
for human information overload and operator error (Johnson 2021). Utilization of AI and 
ML methods to support the warfighter tactical decision-making process, can address 
information overload by presenting rapid risk analysis and decision aids to the warfighter. 
Figure 3 highlights factors that contribute to the complexity of tactical decisions. Coupling 
these inherent factors with LWS complexities creates a complex decision space for 
operators in the field. 
 
Figure 3. Tactical Decision Complexity. Source: Johnson (2021).  
4. Overview of Current Naval Shipboard Laser Weapon Systems 
The U.S. Navy is adopting LWS to enhance ship defensive and offensive 
capabilities. One example is the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and 
Surveillance (HELIOS) which has begun permanent deployment on an Arleigh Burke 
destroyer and has been integrated with its combat system (Magnuson 2021). The HELIOS 
system is a hybrid adaptable fiber based LWS, with a HEL weapon to effect hard kills and 
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an optical dazzler to effect soft kills. The laser component of HELIOS is a 60kW LWS 
designed to counter UAS and small craft (Sherman 2021). 
B. AUTOMATED DECISION AIDS 
Given the complexity of LWS and their departure from traditional kinetic ordnance 
principles warfighters require support in making rapid effective engagement decisions. 
Some level of automation is required to ensure tactical superiority with LWS. Humans 
need support in their LWS engagement decision making. The primary challenge is 
incorporation automation with the human decision maker, as weapon systems generally 
have a human-in-the-loop, that is a person that must make the final engagement 
methodology decision. Automated decision aids can reduce the mental load on the human 
operator and facilitate more rapid and effective decisions. However, development and 
understanding of automation within this space require a review of potential the usage of 
automation methods. This section provides an overview of automation as well as providing 
detail on ML techniques and human machine teaming considerations. 
1. Overview of Automation and Artificial Intelligence 
Automated systems operate with little human interaction or input based on a ruleset 
and standing commands (Johnson 2021). The broader realm of automation covers both ML 
and AI as visualized in the Venn diagram Figure 4. Specialized AI systems are developed 
to mimic human intelligence and decision making by developing knowledge from learned 
behavior or information and applying this knowledge and logic to new information 
received by the system (Johnson 2021). 
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Figure 4. Venn Diagram Automation, Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning. Source: Johnson (2021).  
2. Machine Learning 
Within the domain of AI, ML develops algorithms that optimize decisions based 
on available data (Mitchell 1997). ML is considered a subset of AI and can be used to 
identify patterns, learn from the patterns, and then make decisions as a result of the 
information learned to optimize the intended outcome (Shah 2018). Complex scenarios in 
warfighter engagements can benefit from decisions aids driven by ML applications because 
the systems experience can provide better background for target engagement based on the 
target goals. According to Taiwo Oladipupo Ayodele’s chapter in New Advances in 
Machine Learning, there are multiple types of ML methodologies including supervised 
learning, unsupervised learning, semi-supervised learning, reinforcement learning, and 
transduction (Ayodele 2010, 19–22). Ayodele (2010) states supervised learning consists of 
an ML algorithm generated function which uses user labeled datasets to learn and generate 
desired result and outputs based on the labeled examples. The author asserts unsupervised 
learning is a more complex ML algorithm based on inputs without labeled examples, the 
ML algorithm attempts to learn how to do a task that the user does not define for it. A semi-
supervised ML algorithm combines both supervised and unsupervised methods to create 
both labeled and unlabeled examples. Reinforcement learning consists of an algorithm 
which is given a policy of how to behave in a system where actions have defined impacts 
and the algorithm can then learn based on feedback to identify which impacts to avoid or 
to initiate. Lastly, transduction is based on a system learning based on training inputs 
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outputs instead of starting with a constructed function (Ayodele 2010, 19). Upon reviewing 
these methods supervised learning was selected as the desired approach for this thesis. 
Supervised learning provides a methodology for the inference of a learning 
algorithm based on labeled data (Mark et al. 2015, chap. 1). The SCT modeling software 
outputs labeled data which allows for the use of supervised ML allowing a training data set 
to be developed. With the methodology selected the next step in conducting supervised ML 
is to select one or more techniques to execute the learning process. 
3. Machine Learning Techniques  
Supervised learning has multiple techniques, which support the ML process; they 
are classified into two main categories linear regression and classification techniques 
(Mark et al. 2015, chap. 1). 
a. Linear Regression 
Linear regression uses prediction and forecasting to identify connections and 
dependencies between data and is one of the oldest learning techniques (Mark et al. 2015, 
chap. 1). Linear regression is used when there is one independent variable with a linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Gandhi 2018). Examples 
of suitable linear regression use cases include advertising budget and sales relationships or 
radiation therapy type and tumor sizes (Mark et al. 2015, chap. 1), Linear regression is not 
a suitable technique for use with SCT due to multiple variables, which will be discussed in 
Section 3, and as a result classification is a more suitable technique for this experiment. 
b. Classification Techniques  
Classification is a pattern recognition technique that analyzes data inputs and 
develops a qualitative response, an example of this is identifying fraudulent credit card 
purchases based on multiple variables (Mark et al. 2015, chap. 1). There are many forms 
of classification techniques including logistic regression, decision trees, random forest, K-
nearest neighbor (KNN), and neural networks. Logistic regression is a technique that is 
used when the target variable is categorical, for example if you wanted to identify email 
that was spam or not and had multiple factors, like sender, subject, links, etc., a logistic 
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regression technique would be well suited for this (Swaminathan 2019). Decision trees 
group items with similar features and can be one of the fastest classification methods, they 
also provide a clear visualization of the data (Ayodele 2010, 25). Random forest is a multi-
decision tree collection which provides a more generalized solution (Varghese 2019). 
Provided that KNN is a technique that deals with proximity of data points and requires a 
clear understanding of the inputs, as a result this method was not ideal for this experiment 
(Varghese 2019). Neural networks are multi-node systems where each node is its own 
linear regression model and require very large quantities of training data which could not 
be supplied by SCT given the scope and timeframe of this study (IBM 2020). For this 
experiment three classification techniques will be used and compared: logistic regression, 
decision tree, and random forest, these methods were selected based on the data generated 
from SCT and each respective techniques attributes.  
4. Human-Machine Teaming and Trust Considerations   
Data analysis is conducted by AI to generate and assess decisions in complex 
situations and ML can be used to train a system to better identify tactical courses of action 
in complex systems (Johnson 2019, 1). Multiple types of data can be processed with ML, 
from images and speech to objects and patterns. Naval warfighters must process a large 
amount of data for decision making and will require AI and ML to highlight the most 
relevant information to inform faster and better decisions in the stress of combat (Galdorisi 
2019). One end state for AI and ML implementation in tactical decisions making is in 
support of automated and semi-automated decision aids. Two major challenges in 
implementing an intelligent battle decision aid are to create an effective human-machine 
teaming relationship and to create an effective human-machine trust dynamic.  
Implementation of ML as a decision support tool methodology is ongoing in multiple 
fields including the healthcare industry. There has been a trend to generate ML driven 
diagnosis tools in clinical settings for patient diagnosis. Increasingly, ML is used to support 
clinical decisions to improve human diagnostic performance; however, a study of ML based 
clinical support decision systems found that these ML systems were at a high risk of bias and 
that for better results, a supported human decision should be considered above standalone 
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ML diagnostic systems (Vasey et al. 2021, 1–2). This highlights the need for a human to be 
part of the decisions aid system that can leverage the ML data support to make rapid, and 
effective assessments and take data driven action. Fully automated or heavily automated 
military decision aids that do not properly integrate the operator can lead to failure by 
operator over-reliance on, or lack of trust in, decision aids  (Paradis 1999). The balance of an 
effective AI or ML decision support requires proper user integration and effective data 
analysis to ensure it is a net benefit to the system it is implemented in. 
Utilizing ML to better prioritize LWS targets and inform the operator of the greatest 
threat is one method where the user and ML system could work in harmony to inform an 
expedient and effective kill. The complexity of LWS characteristics and drone threats 
provide a prime example of the need for ML supported decision making by the warfighter.  
C. DRONE SWARM THREATS 
Drone swarm threats were selected as the simulated enemy because of the complex 
nature and wide range of capabilities which can be countered by effective LWS. Usage of 
drones have greatly increased in the last twenty years with multiple mission capabilities 
including surveillance, reconnaissance, and direct-action combat support (Guitton 2021, 
26). Drones have become more prevalent, cheaper, and more capable requiring specific 
anti-drone strategies as drones may appear in any conflict (Guitton 2021, 26).  
1. Swarm Considerations 
Drones represent a dynamic and scalable threat that can drastically change the battle 
space. Single drone attacks like the explosive laden drone used to attack the Erbil Airport 
in Iraq, which consisted of a single drone carrying explosives, detonated targeting U.S. 
forces. (Reuters 2021). Single drones are a threat; however, multi drone attacks represent 
a greater challenge and threat to military forces. When multiple drones are operating 
together, either autonomously or manually controlled, they can perform multi-unit assaults 
referred to as drone swarms (Guitton 2021, 28). These drone swarms can be homogenous, 
multiple drones of one type, or heterogenous where there are multiple types of drones all 
in the same swarm. Figure 5 shows a SCT screenshot with four types of drones attacking 
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a Blue Force vessel: fighter drones, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
drones, bomber drones, and Loitering Suicide Munition (LSM) drones.  
 
Figure 5. Heterogenous Swarm Attack Scenario. Source: MOVES (2021). 
The wide array of drone types and functions create challenging battlefield 
conditions as operators need to assess and engage hostile drones quickly and effectively. 
Shipboard LWS allow for rapid target engagement and can support hard and soft kills. 
Additionally, a LWS with a decision support aid would further support the warfighter and 
ensure more successful drone swarm engagements.  
Drone swarms pose a significant threat and need to be adequality accounted for in 
risk assessments because of the inexpensive cost and ease of use (Dunn 2013, 1245). 
Drones can be procured and assembled easily and then laden with explosives, or they can 
be used their kinetic energy to mechanically damage planes or systems (Dunn 2013, 1245). 
Drone swarms of sufficiently large quantities have the potential to overwhelm a ship’s 
defensive capabilities (Laird 2016). Utilizing decisions aides or modeling to optimize 
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engagement of the drone swarm can support an operator to engage the drone threats quickly 
and more effectually (Laird 2016). Because of their potential in anti-drone operations LWS 
are being researched and designed to detect, track, and neutralize drone threats for ground 
troops on mobile vehicle platforms (Eckstein 2013). Advanced LWS are becoming more 
prevalent in effective anti-drone warfare because they can scale to meet the needs of the 
warfighter from shipboard lasers to small mobile vehicle lasers there is a high degree of 
scalability allowing for a relevant set of solutions to address drone threats. 
2. Target Engagement Methodology  
Targeting is a key step in the kill chain process especially when utilizing LWS 
because of the necessity of a clear risk assessment, deconfliction, and identification of 
viable LWS targets. Decision aids for the huma-machine team can support more effective 
targeting and by extension enhancing the engagement success probability. Targeting was 
selected as a key area for decision support because of the complex and relatively new 
implementation of LWS. Targeting is one step in the overall kill chain cycle process of 
Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2E2A) kill chain cycle pictured in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess Kill Chain Cycle. Source: 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013). 
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Per the United States Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint publication 3–0, 
Joint Operations Targeting is defined as “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets 
and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of command objectives, 
operational requirements, and capabilities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018). 
Target prioritization is key to successful operations by the U.S. Armed Forces. 
Drone swarms pose a unique threat in modern warfare as they are large inexpensive groups 
of hostile forces that can fulfil multiple roles ranging from reconnaissance to direct action 
attacks. Knowing which drones to target and engage may mean the difference between a 
ship’s survival. Countries like China are interested in using drone swarms for U.S. Aircraft 
Carrier targeting (Kallenborn and Bleek 2018, 524). Drone swarms are not necessarily 
homogenous, and proper identification, targeting, and engagement of the drones that pose 
the greatest risk to ship survivability is paramount. When implementing a new LWS on 
ship having a system that can support effective and risk-based targeting can improve LWS 
performance in terms of ship survivability. The primary goal of this research is to determine 
if ship survivability can be maximized by using ML in simulated LWS engagements with 
heterogenous drone swarms to optimize targeting and engagement methodology while 
maximizing kills of enemy forces.  
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III. SWARM COMMANDER TACTICS AND MACHINE 
LEARNING EXPERIMENTATION 
Experimentation based on simulated ship LWS and drone swarm engagements 
provides a simple and effective method for evaluation the efficacy of ML in supporting 
target engagement methodology. The beginning of this section describes the software 
elements and their features for simulation and machine learning and is designed to provide 
sufficient background as well as the experimental approach. After the background 
overview the experiment is detailed, following the three-phase method outlined in section 
1.A Approach:  Phase 1 gathering and preparing, Phase 2 training, and Phase 3 deploying 
and improving.  
A. SWARM COMMANDER TACTICS SOFTWARE OVERVIEW 
The NPS MOVES Institute has created a software program called SCT which 
generates simulated engagements between Red and Blue forces. SCT was originally 
designed as a tactics’ “game” where NPS Students could develop their strategies in a 
simulated battle space. Over time, the model began to grow and include directed energy 
(DE) systems, atmospheric data, and more realistic simulation elements. SCT will serve as 
the virtual simulation test environment LWS UAV swarm engagements. This section is 
designed to provide better understanding of SCT and its capabilities.  
1. Relevant Software Program Organizational Elements and Overview 
The SCT software contains elements to allow for multi-user game play, player 
editing and setup, development of combat scenarios, development of system element 
behaviors called “plays,” and scenario simulations or “runs.” This thesis focuses on the 
scenario development in the scenario editor function, scenario runner, and plays. The title 
screen for software commander is shown in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. Swarm Commander Tactics Main Menu. Source: MOVES (2021). 
a. Scenario Editor 
Scenario Editor is the primary menu for setting up a simulated battle within a battle 
space, players are established with player assets including asset types, quantities, 
positioning, and asset goals. The editor is used to generate a unique environment where 
simulations can be established in a controlled environment. The scenario editor allows for 
mission objectives based on plays to be attributed to each entity, for example the Blue 
Force ship entity can be programmed to hold (defend) a position while the Red Force UAV 
can be programmed to attack the Blue Force ship entity. Figure 8 shows a sample scenario 
editor with Red and Blue Force elements. 
 
Figure 8. Sample Swarm Commander Tactics Scenario Editor. Source: 
MOVES (2021). 
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b. Scenario Runner 
The scenario runner is the actual simulation of the developed scenario with 
programmed entities. The simulation is conducted in real-time and each entity attempts to 
execute their programmed mission. The software logs data during the engagement 
including time, entity location, damage taken or health of entity, ship LWS power level, 
and entity status (alive or killed). The software outputs a .csv data file after each simulation 
which allows for data harvesting and analysis. Figure 9 shows an active shot of a red team 
versus blue team simulation scenario. 
 
Figure 9. Sample Scenario Running. Source: MOVES (2021). 
c. Play Designer 
The play designer software element allows for behaviors to be developed for entity 
attribution in the scenario editor, this allows experimentation with entity behavior to model 
the effects of various behaviors like target prioritization. This designer allows for the 
addition of rulesets to identify optimized behavior in the scenario ruins. Figure 10 shows a 
sample play behavior development tree representing the command to attack when enemies 
are within weapons range. The default settings for target engagement behavior in SCT is 
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proximity based, meaning the nearest enemy target is the default engagement regardless of 
the target’s actual threat level, as an example, a Red Force ISR drone in closer proximity 
to a blue Force ship would be targeted over a bomber drone even though the bomber drone 
poses a greater potential threat to the ship. The ability to modify entity behavior allows for 
more optimized engagement methodology to be implemented. The second engagement 
methodology developed to support this research was the threat prioritization play which is 
a Blue Force command to ignore non-offensive capable enemy units and target and engage 
only UAVs which pose a damage threat.  
 
Figure 10. Swarm Commander Tactics Play Designer Attack Behavior When 
Enemies in Weapons Range. Source: MOVES (2021). 
2. Swarm Commander Tactics Software System Entities  
a. UAVs 
The software program has five different UAV systems, each with unique qualities 
and functions:  
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1. ISR UAVs, a small UAV which does not pose a damage threat to any 
systems. 
2. Fighter UAVs poses a damage threat to aircraft (1 unit), and no threat to 
ships, its primary function is air to air drone warfare. The fighter UAVs 
are not capable of sinking the ship. 
3. Bomber UAV Variant 1 standard drops ordinance onto ships and causes 
poses a moderate damage threat (1 unit of damage). Multiple ordinance 
impacts are required to sink the ship. 
4. Bomber UAV Variant 2 Loitering Suicide Munition (LSM) represents a 
suicide UAV laden with explosives which rams into and detonates itself 
on the ship target this causes a damage (5 units of damage). Multiple 
impacts are required to sink the ship. 
5. Bomber UAV Variant 3 Missile Platform, This UAV deploys an anti-ship 
cruise missile which causes significant damage (25 units of damage) to the 
ship, a single missile impact sinks the ship. 
The UAVs specific damage characteristics are summarized in Table 1 and pictured 
in Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13, note that the bomber variant is represented by one 
figure type as all three share the same general aesthetic model.  
Table 1. Swarm Commander Tactics UAV Damage and Speed 
Characteristics 
UAV Type Damage units to ship 
Cooldown 
(seconds) Speed (m/s) 
UAV Fighter 0 5 100 
UAV Bomber Variant 1               
(air to ground bomber) 1 5 80 
UAV Bomber Variant 2       
(loitering suicide munition) 5 N/A 80 
UAV Bomber Variant 3           
(cruise missile platform) 25 30 80 
UAV ISR 0 N/A 120 
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Figure 11. Red Force Fighter UAV. Source: MOVES (2021). 
 
Figure 12. Red Force Bomber UAV General Representation. Source: MOVES 
(2021). 
 
Figure 13. Red Force ISR UAV. Source: MOVES (2021). 
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b. Simulated Ship 
The Blue Force general representation of a ship for surface to air engagements. 
Simulated DE weapon system with which includes atmospheric attenuation using NPS 
ANCHOR, a laser performance scaling code that provides rapid estimates of laser 
performance in the given conditions (Collins 2016). The ship laser directed energy weapon 
defines inputs to its firing calculation including output power, wavelength, beam diameter, 
jitter, and atmospheric data when targeting and engaging a hostile target (MOVES 2021). 
The ship’s laser is a 10,000-watt system with a wavelength of 1.0642e-06 meters. The total 
energy battery for the system is 300 simulated units with a 1 unit per second power usage 
rate (MOVES 2021). This Ship model and LWS is a simplified representation of a 
shipboard LWS and does not match real-world systems, it is simply used for simulation 
purposes. The Blue Force ship model is pictured in Figure 14. 
  
Figure 14. Blue Force Ship. Source: MOVES (2021). 
B. ORANGE ML SOFTWARE APPLICATION OVERVIEW  
Implementation of ML based on the simulation data from SCT required a 
programming environment, to facilitate the ML execution the software program Orange 
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was selected to conduct the ML portion of the experiment. Orange software was selected 
to be the ML software suite because it is an open-source software for ML and data 
visualization that has a user interface with a widget toolbox (Orange Data Mining [Orange], 
n.d.). Orange software allows users to conduct ML by setting up a graphical interface 
instead of having to code multiple elements in the computer language Python. The ML 
interface is referred to as a project workflow, a sample workflow is presented in Figure 15 
which shows the file linkage to a classification decision tree, distribution statistics, and a 
scatter plot. 
 
Figure 15. Sample Workflow from Orange v3.26. Source: Orange (2021). 
The Orange software be programmed to take data inputs and group based on the 
data attributes. During the initial familiarization with Orange, a group of UAVs was imported 
and the system was able to learn which UAVs are attributed with certain speed levels and 
damage capabilities. Subsequently, a blind import excluding the UAV type was put into 
Orange and the system generated a grouping scatter plot correctly identify the UAVs by 
attributes, this is shown in Figure 16. The Orange software project also generated a 
classification tree for UAV types based on attributes, as shown in Figure 17, which shows how 
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the grouping was performed based on learned attributes. This exercise provides background 
for how the overall experiment was conducted using initial data to support learning    
 
Figure 16. Trained ML UAV 2 Factor Scatter Plot Sample Workflow from 
Orange v3.26. Source: University of Ljubljana (2021). 
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Figure 17. Trained ML UAV Type Classification Tree from Orange v3.26. 
Source: Orange (2021). 
C. PHASE 1: DEVELOPMENT OF INITIAL SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
Phase 1 of the experiment serves a baseline for comparison of the basic engagement 
logic in SCT. The simulation scenario types and methodologies are discussed below in tow 
primary subsections the threat scenarios and the engagement methodology. The threat 
scenarios consist of two primary categories, homogenous and heterogeneous drone 
swarms. The engagement methodology section breaks out the two primary methodologies 
studied in this experiment proximity-based engagement and threat-based engagement. 
Simulation scenarios were generated based on the threat scenarios and engagement 
methodologies to create a baseline data set to train the ML algorithm.  
1. Blue Force Engagement Mythology Variables  
Blue Force engagement methodology consists of two primary methods, proximity 
engagement and threat engagement. Engagement methodology is the target variable for the 
experiment as it represents the decision required to ensure maximum combat effectiveness. 
The entire experiment is designed to provide decision support recommendation to the LWS 
operator based on the battlespace conditions and variables. The proximity methodology will 
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command the ship to attack all targets and prioritize the closest target first. The proximity 
method is effective provided the ship can destroy all enemies, meaning no enemies would 
need to be engaged by other Blue Force assets in a real-world scenario freeing other assets 
up to continue their missions. However, should the ship be overwhelmed due to the number 
or types of enemy UAVs there is greater risk of loss of the ship when implementing the 
proximity engagement methodology. The threat engagement method prioritizes the most 
dangerous enemies only, this could require other Blue Force assets to engage fighter drones 
or other non-offensive damage capable UAVs. The threat priority method ignores ISR or 
Fighter drones, which pose no damage threat to the ship. These two engagement methods 
were selected based on the current capabilities of the SCT software as they can be 
programmed in the current version and allow for two distinct approaches to a simulated 
engagement. The optimal engagement methodology must be selected based on the UAV 
types and quantities present in the battlespace. The variables which the ML software must 
assess are the variable type numerical or categorical, and whether the variable is a feature or 
the target variable, the goal variable. Variable classifications in the simulation scenarios are 
defined in Table 2. 





2. Homogenous and Heterogenous Threat Scenarios 
Initial threat scenarios were simulated to build user knowledge of the SCT software 
and the data outputs generated each time a scenario was simulated. Initial simulation 
scenarios involved Red and Blue Force engagements with one Red Force threat type, this 
means varying quantities of homogenous UAVs attacked the Blue Force Ship, see Figure 
18 for a sample attack wave. The data generated in these basic scenarios shows the 
approximate quantity of homogenous UAVs required to destroy the Blue Force Ship 
regardless of engagement strategy. The total quantity by UAV type required to kill the Blue 
Force Ship is summarized in Table 3. 
 
Figure 18. Homogenous UAV Wave Swarm Commander Tactics. Source: 
MOVES (2021). 
Table 3. Homogenous UAV Units Required to Destroy Blue Force Ship 
 
UAV Type Quantity Needed to Destroy Blue Force Ship
UAV Fighter N/A- Non-Offensive to Ship
UAV ISR N/A- Non-Offensive to Ship
UAV Bomber Variant 1                    
( air to ground bomber) 90
UAV Bomber Variant 2       
(loitering suicide munition)
N/A-Maximum simulated wave was 300 units, 
failed to destroy Ship
UAV Bomber Variant 3           
(cruise missile platform) 29
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Homogenous attacks for each UAV type listed in Table 2 were simulated with up 
to three hundred units to determine the quantity of each UAV type required to overwhelm 
the Blue Force defenses. Losses to homogenous waves represent enemy UAV quantities 
that, regardless of engagement tactics, would overwhelm the Ship defenses. These 
homogenous scenarios were run to develop a baseline for UAV type lethality. The Fighter 
UAV type though non-offensive was simulated as they were used in heterogeneous attack 
waves to represent non direct threat UAVs. The most devastating UAV was the UAV 
Bomber Variant 3 which fires an anti-ship missile, when 29 units fire in concert the ship is 
unable to destroy all the incoming missiles and is destroyed. The UAV Bomber Variant 1 
air to ground bomber can overwhelm the Blue Force with a wave of 90 or more units. The 
UAV Bomber Variant 2 LSM was unable to reach the ship prior to being destroyed even 
at the maximum wave size of 300 units.  
Heterogenous simulation scenarios involved Red and Blue Force engagements with 
multiple Red Force threat types, this means varying quantities of heterogenous UAVs were 
simulated attacking the Blue Force Ship, see Figure 19 for a sample attack wave. The data 
generated in these basic scenarios was used to see the damage taken and power utilized by 
the Blue Force Ship. Like the homogenous scenarios, heterogenous threat attacks were 
conducted until the destruction of the Blue Force Ship or until the attacks rendered the laser 
system inert through power drain (which did not occur in any of the simulations). 
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Figure 19. Heterogenous UAV Wave Swarm Commander Tactics. Source: 
MOVES (2021). 
D. PHASE II: ML TRAINING  
Training of ML algorithm in this experiment was conducted using supervised 
learning because of the availability of labeled simulation data. The initial simulations 
generated in SCT were used to train the ML algorithm and training was conducted in 
multiple iterations to optimize the algorithm. This section discusses the training as well as 
the comparison and selection of the optimum ML technique classification process.  
1. Machine Learning Training Process Overview 
Training the ML algorithm began with the generation of baseline data simulations 
in SCT. The baseline scenarios needed to be random to avoid bias and to ensure this initial 
training scenario parameters were generated in an Excel sheet built with a random number 
generation set for each variable provided in Table 2. These generated conditions including 
UAV types and quantities and the random engagement methodology were input and 
simulated in SCT. The output simulation data was from SCT was input into Orange and 
evaluated with multiple ML technique evaluation methods including forest, random forest, 
and logistic regression. The ML algorithm training was conducted in two iterations to 
determine if there was an increase in optimization. The workflow package developed in 
Orange for initial ML training and an additional iteration are shown in Figure 20 and Figure 




Figure 20. Initial Experiment Workflow from Orange v3.26. Source: Orange (2021). 
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Figure 21. Iterative Workflow from Orange v3.26. Source: Orange (2021). 
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2. Comparison and ML Technique Evaluation 
Multiple ML techniques (forest, random forest, and logistic regression) were 
utilized to identify the most effective technique in the ML algorithm for predictions 
supporting decisions on future ship engagements. Each ML technique needed to be tested 
and scored allowing for comparison using evaluation metrics. Common evaluation metrics 
include: 
• Classification accuracy (CA) is the overall accuracy of the model, meaning 
how frequently will the ML model be correct. 
• Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) “provides an 
aggregate measure of performance … One way of interpreting AUC is as 
the probability that the model ranks a random positive example more highly 
than a random negative example.” (Google 2020) 
• Precision is a helpful metric “when the costs of false positives are high” 
(Nicholson, n.d.).  
• Recall is beneficial “when the cost of false negatives is high” (Nicholson 
n.d.).  
• F1 is a combination of precision and recall which can provide insight to 
false positives and false negatives (Nicholson n.d.). 
Each evaluation metric has advantages and disadvantages, but overall, the CA is an 
effective general method as it denotes the true accuracy of the model which informs the 
viability of using the classification technique for prediction future outcomes. Using the 
AUC gives the correct proportion of correctly classified data instances. The precision and 
recall metrics are beneficial depending on the criticality of false positives or false 
negatives. For the SCT simulations, a false positive would mean the engagement method 
selected for the incoming swarm was predicted to lose the battle and in fact the Blue Force 
would have won. False negatives would be predicting the Blue Force victory when in fact 
the Blue Force would lose, false negatives are more costly in the ML algorithm because a 
false negative provides the LWS operator bad information which jeopardizes the Ship’s 
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survivability. The F1 metric combines precision and recall mathematically as shown in 
Figure 21, and is a helpful amalgamation of precision and recall.  
 
Figure 22. F1 Metric Equation. Source: Nicholson (n.d.). 
E. PHASE III: DEPLOYING AND IMPROVING PROCESS 
After the training process in Phase II the deploying and improvement process 
occurred consisting of two main tasks, deployment of the ML algorithm using a selected 
classification ML technique to predict future engagement outcomes and to iteratively train 
the ML model to see if further optimization is achievable. Utilizing the metrics for ML 
technique evaluation the most effective classification technique was found to be tree 
classification due to the combination of its CA, precision, recall and F1 performance. 
Random forest classification was the second most effective method with slightly smaller 
CA, precision, recall and F1 performance. Logistic regression was not nearly as effective 
as tree or random forest with a lower CA, precision, recall and F1 score. The complete 
scoring of each ML method is summarized in Figure 23.  
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IV. RESULTS AND DATA OPTIMIZATION 
A. INITIAL SIMULATION RESULTS SUMMARY  
Initial homogenous and heterogenous simulations were generated at random to 
develop the baseline data to train the ML algorithm, in total 273 simulated baseline battles 
were run in the SCT software. Overall, the threat engagement methodology is more 
effective in ensuring a Blue Force victory in terms of ship survival as seen in Table 4. The 
primary drawback of the threat engagement methodology is that enemy fighters and ISR 
UAVs are left alone by the Blue Force Ship which in a complex battlespace with multiple 
Blue Force assets another Blue Force entity would need to engage them tying up additional 
resources. Ideally, the Proximity engagement would be used to neutralize all enemies 
provided the Blue Force Operators could determine survivability and success rates prior to 
the engagement which is the purpose of prediction modeling with ML. 




The initial simulation data was fed into the ML algorithm to train it to identify 
optimum strategies for successful engagements where the Blue Force survived and while 
maximizing enemies destroyed. Using the training data, a first iteration model algorithm 
was developed to serve as a prediction and decision support tool. The ML model provides 
predictions of combat scenarios and would allow the Blue Force to select the appropriate 
















Proximity 161 106 55 66%
Threat 112 100 12 89%
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B. ML ALGORITHM RESULTS 
Optimization of engagement methodology using the ML model occurred in two 
iterations, the first after initial training and the second using the data from the first iteration. 
Initially, a series of new Blue Force versus Red Force engagements was generated in Excel, 
again using random quantities and types of UAVs and fed into a prediction tool within 
Orange which draws on the learned data to provide expected win or loss conditions based 
on the Blue Force’s engagement methodology.  
1. First Iteration of ML Prediction 
The initial ML prediction based on trained data generated a classification tree 
sowing the probabilities of Blue Force winning engagements based on the types and 
quantities of enemy UAVs and the Blue Force engagement methodology (threat or 
proximity). The classification tree shown in  Figure 24 provides a graphical representation 
of the potential engagement outcomes. This classification tree was generated based on the 






Figure 24. 1st Iteration ML Classification from Orange v3.26. Source: Orange (2021). 
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Using the randomized Excel generator 69 new scenarios were generated and tested 
in the ML prediction algorithm in Orange. For the initial prediction run all three 
classification techniques tree, random forest, and logistic regression were analyzed to 
confirm that tree classification was in fact the most effective ML technique for simulated 
SCT data analysis. The results of the ML predictions are presented in Table 5. Overall, the 
tree classification technique had the fewest false negatives and highest correct threat 
engagement methodology predictions. The tree classification was less accurate for 
proximity engagement methodology; however, the ML technique was more conservative 
than the random forest and logistic regression as evidenced the eight false positives (losses 
predicted when wins occurred). Overall tree classification is still the most desirable ML 
technique for predictions of SCT engagements.  




















(predicted win and 
loss occurred)
Proximity 35 27 8 77% 8 0















(predicted win and 
loss occurred)
Proximity 35 29 6 83% 5 1















(predicted win and 
loss occurred)
Proximity 35 30 5 86% 3 2





2. Second Iteration of ML Predictions  
Upon completion of the initial prediction run the model was re-trained using the 
results from the additional scenarios to ensure the algorithm had access to additional 
scenarios. The second iteration of predictions was executed using another randomized 
group of scenarios and the ML algorithm was used to predict the outcome of the simulated 
engagements. The results of the predictions are provided in Table 6. Once again, a 
classification tree was generated to provide a graphic representation of what the algorithm 
had learned, this is shown in Figure 25.  
The second iteration prediction run increased the overall correct percentage of 
Proximity engagement predictions and slightly decreased the threat engagement 
predictions. Overall, there was also an increase in false negatives. After reviewing the 
scenario specifics, it was determined that some of the newly developed test scenarios were 
outside the range of what the ML algorithm had seen. For example, there was a scenario 
with a large quantity of LSM Bombers with Fighter UAVs which effectively screened the 
LSM bombers long enough for them to execute a ship kill. Another scenario had twenty-
three missile platform bombers and a large quantity of fighters again acting as a screen 
allowing the ship to be overwhelmed in proximity engagement mode. Both false negative 
examples represent a gap in the ML algorithm’s training, the ML incorrectly predicted 
victory based on the training data which included homogenous scenarios where both 
bomber types were easily defeated based on the quantity present. As a result of the decrease 
in performance the ML algorithm was subsequently trained again with a larger data set to 
attempt to improve performance.  


















(predicted win and 
loss occurred)
Proximity 43 39 5 91% 1 4




Figure 25. 2nd Iteration ML Classification from Orange v3.26. Source:  Orange (2021). 
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3. Additional ML Optimization and Evaluation  
The ML algorithm was retrained using a larger set of simulation data including 
multiple scenarios where Red Force drone swarm attacks were heterogenous and fighter 
UAVs were effectively screening for Bomber UAVs. In total, 420 simulation scenarios 
were used to train the algorithm including all of the baseline scenarios and previously tested 
prediction scenarios. To demonstrate the improvement in the ML Algorithm, a comparison 
of the initial ML model and the final ML model is provided below in Table 7 and Table 8. 
The increased training data and multiple iteration approach greatly improved the prediction 
accuracy of the ML algorithm. Overall, the multiple iteration approach improved the 
overall accuracy and reduces the total false negatives and positives.  
Table 7. Comparative Results for Prediction of Simulation Scenarios in 
Orange  
 





















Proximity 244 218 26 89.3% 22 9.0% 4 1.6%



















Proximity 244 229 15 93.9% 8 3.3% 7 2.9%
Threat 176 175 1 99.4% 1 0.6% 0 0.0%
Initial Model Accuracy
 Final Model Accuracy




Model 92% 3.1% 5.2%
Final 
Model 96% 1.7% 2.1%
Model Comparison Summary
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C. ML ALGORITHM PREDICTIONS AS A DECISION AID SUPPORT 
TOOL 
The training and optimization of the ML provides the foundation for a user decision 
aid in selecting engagement methodology for SCT simulations. By implementing the ML 
algorithm to assess an approaching drone swarm, the appropriate engagement technique 
can be selected. The ML algorithm provides the user with insight as to the optimal 
engagement strategy. The user would determine based on the ML prediction whether to 
target the threats, the UAV bombers, or target all enemies based on proximity and this 
engagement decision would support the most enemy kills while prioritizing the ship’s 
survival. The ML algorithm has reduced the cognitive load on the system user by 
quantifying the courses of action in terms of most likely outcome for complex heterogenous 





This research studied the combination of simulated wargaming and ML as a proof 
of concept and as a foundation for a decision support tool. To accomplish this goal multiple 
ML techniques were tested using simulated LWS engagements to determine if ML could 
support automated decision aids based on simulated data. Overall, ML techniques were 
evaluated to support engagement methodology analysis for use with a simulated LWS to 
defend against complex drone swarm threats effectively. Experimentation demonstrated 
the application of ML to this problem domain through modeling and simulation and ML 
algorithm training. Results from the ML algorithm predictions had an overall accuracy of 
96% in predicting engagement outcomes based on enemy types and quantities, and LWS 
attack methodology. The ML algorithm predictions had false positives (a predicted win 
that was actually a loss) 2.1% of the time. These results demonstrate that a complex battle 
space simulation software can be used to accurately train a predictive ML algorithm.  
The thesis demonstrates that a research approach that combines wargaming 
simulations with the development of ML algorithms provides a mechanism for studying 
and supporting the use of automation and AI techniques for supporting complex decisions 
and engagements. By implementing a trained ML algorithm, it is possible to analyze a 
complex battlespace with a heterogenous drone swarm so the appropriate engagement 
technique can be selected thereby optimizing the survivability and effectiveness of target 
engagement. The thesis addressed the research objective by demonstrating the efficacy of 
ML as a method to identify and support effective target selection and engagement methods 
for a simulated shipboard LWS defending against UAV swarm threats. This research 
represents a fundamental building block for the development of an automated decision aid 
to support future warfighters operating laser weapon systems. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNUTIES 
There are multiple future research opportunities in the implementation of ML to 
support warfighter engagement decisions, the two primary areas are testing expanded 
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simulations and engagements to create more complex ML algorithms and developing ML 
optimized decision aids integrated with user interfaces that can be tested in simulated 
wargaming environments.  
Expansion of the ML training and simulated engagements could be conducted in 
SCT to generate scenarios on a larger scale with multiple Blue Force assets with distinct 
missions. Multi-ship engagements and multi-domain engagements with land, sea, and air 
systems working together could be developed to support large scale wargaming scenarios 
which create an opportunity to generate complex data. The more complex multi-asset 
simulations could be used to train ML algorithms to support target engagement decisions 
across multiple platforms (ships, aircraft, and ground systems). The SCT software is 
constantly growing and expanding as it is upgraded with new systems, capabilities, and 
enticements. The adaptability of SCT allows for programming to establish specific 
environments including blue ocean, islands, and land engagements.  
Development of decision aids using trained ML algorithms presents a unique 
opportunity to test the utility of ML algorithms in a tactical application. Further research 
could be conducted to take a ML algorithm and build it into the wargaming software to 
provide a user interface for making tactical decisions in a simulated environment. This 
represents the next step in bringing this research into practical applications by providing 
mock warfighters with tactical decision aids based on simulated engagements with the 
objectives of reducing the cognitive load on warfighters and ensuring they have the tools 
and capabilities to execute missions rapidly and effectively.  
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